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On July 1, 1994 Maryland codified its rules of evidence,I bringing
them into accord with the substance of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 2 In doing so, Maryland followed the trend set by thirty-seven
other states.' The codified evidence rules, known collectively as Title
5 of the Maryland Rules, were made applicable to "all actions and
proceedings in the courts of this State," ' 4 with some exceptions.5
t Judge, Maryland Court of Appeals. B.A., 1958, University of Maryland; J.D.,
1961, University of Maryland School of Law; LL.M. 1962 Harvard University
Law School.
T Assistant Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.A.,
1981, University of Maryland Baltimore County; J.D. 1984, University of
Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Lynn McLain for
her valuable insight into the codification process of the Maryland Rules of
Evidence and Professor Stephen Shapiro for his research suggestions and
encouragement on this project. I would also like to thank my research assistant
Danielle Gibbs for her superb work in researching and reviewing the earlier
drafts. Mark Donohue and Ronald Miller are acknowledged for their valuable
editorial assistance.
1. MD. RULES 5-101 to 5-1008.
2. LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND RULES OF EVIDENCE 1 (1994). Professor McLain's
work provides a summary comparison of each Maryland rule to its federal
counterpart. Id. at 13-17.
3. Those states include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Two United States territories, Guam
and Puerto Rico, have also adopted an evidence code. See MCLAIN, supra note
2, at I (collecting statutory provisions).
4. MD. RULE 5-101(a). The rules order, filed by the court of appeals on December
15, 1993, provided "that the Rules in Title 5 . . . shall govern the courts of
this state and all parties and their attorneys in all actions and proceedings
therein, except as otherwise provided in such Rules." 21:1 MD. R. 16 (Jan. 7,
1994); McLAIN, supra note 2, at 41.
5. MD. RULE 5-101(b). The Maryland Rules of Evidence, other than those relating
to the competency of witnesses, MD. RULE 5-101(b), do not apply to the
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Additionally, the newly codified rules give Maryland courts the
discretion to avoid strict application of the rules in certain proceed-
ings.
6
One of the more difficult questions that the Court of Appeals
of Maryland considered when it codified the rules of evidence was
whether to adopt some form of .the residual hearsay exceptions set
forth in the Federal Rules of Evidence. 7
following proceedings:
(1) Proceedings before grand juries;
(2) Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
(3) Direct contempt proceedings in which the court may act sum-
marily;
(4) Small claim actions under Rule 3-701 and appeals under Rule
7-112(c)(2);
(5) Issuance of a summons or warrant under Rule 4-212;
(6) Pretrial release under Rule 4-216 or release after conviction
under Rule 4-349;
(7) Preliminary hearings under Rule 4-221;
(8) Post-sentencing procedures under Rule 4-340;
(9) Sentencing in non-capital cases under Rule 4-342;
(10) Issuance of a search warrant under Rule 4-601;
(11) Detention and shelter care hearings under Rule 912; and
(12) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the
rules in this Title, the court was traditionally not bound by the
common-law rules of evidence.
MD. RULE 5-101(b).
6. Maryland Rule 5-101(c) provides:
In the following proceedings, the court may, in the interest of justice,
decline to require strict application of the rules in this Title other
than those relating to the competency of witnesses:
(1) The determination of questions of fact preliminary to admissibility
of evidence when the issue is to be determined by the court under
Rule 5-104(a);
(2) Proceedings for revocation of probation under Rule 4-347;
(3) Hearings on petitions for post-conviction relief under Rule 4-406;
(4) Plenary proceedings in the Orphans' Court under Rule 6-462;
(5) Waiver hearings under Rule 913;
(6) Disposition hearings under Rule 915;
(7) Modification hearings under Rule 916; and
(8) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the rules
in this Title, the court was authorized to decline to apply the common-
law rules of evidence.
MD. RULE 5-101(C).
7. The Evidence Rules Subcommittee had recommended, by a divided vote, that
the residual exceptions not be adopted. The full Committee had adopted the
subcommittee proposal because a motion to reject or amend the proposal failed
twice, also by nearly divided votes. Judge Howard S. Chasanow, Address to
the Wrangler's Law Club (Oct. 21, 1993) (on file with authors); McLAtN, supra
note 2, at 268.
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Federal Rule 803 provides:
the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the fore-
going exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guar-
antees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A)
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.8
Rule 804(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that, though
the declarant is not available as a witness, the hearsay rule will not
exclude:
[a] statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is
offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general
purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this
exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing
to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant. 9
This Article will explore the historical development of the hearsay
rule and will focus on the residual hearsay exceptions. It will discuss
the development of the residual exceptions and some of the challenges
that the federal courts have encountered when interpreting them. It
8. FED. R. Evin. 803(24).
9. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5).
19941
will also examine Confrontation Clause 0 concerns that have been
generated by the use of residual hearsay exceptions in criminal trials."
Finally, it will discuss the background and substance of Maryland's
recently adopted residual exceptions and how those rules differ from
their federal counterparts. 2
10. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
11. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), is the most recent Supreme Court
analysis of the interplay between the Confrontation Clause and the residual
exception. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court
has held that hearsay exceptions which are "firmly rooted" in. the common
law satisfy the reliability requirement of the Confrontation Clause. Wright,
497 U.S. at 814; Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987). The
Supreme Court has recognized dying declarations, prior testimony, business
records, public records, excited utterances, statements made seeking medical
treatment, and co-conspirator statements as "firmly rooted" exceptions to the
hearsay rule. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 816, 820, 821 (1990)
(recognizing co-conspirator statements, excited utterances, dying declarations,
medical treatment, and prior testimony); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171, 183 (1987) (recognizing co-conspirator statements); Ohio v. Roberts, 448
U.S. 56, 66 n.8 (1980) (recognizing dying declarations, prior testimony, business
records, and public records).
12. Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(24) provides that:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
MD. RuLE 5-803(b)(24).
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(5) provides that:
Under exceptional circumstances, the following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if
the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of
a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for
which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of
these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission
of the statement into evidence. A statement may not be admitted
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
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II. THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF THE RULE AGAINST
HEARSAY
Evidence scholar John H. Wigmore heralded the rule against
hearsay as the "most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law
of evidence-a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, [as]
the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system to
the world's methods of procedure."'
3 As a matter of both federal14
and state 5 law, hearsay is generally inadmissible unless it falls within
an exception to the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule emerged during
the 1600s along with the development of the jury trial system and
the practice of calling witnesses as the principal source of proof at
trial. 16
In criminal cases in the 1500's and down to the middle
1600's the main reliance of the prosecution was the use of
. .. 'depositions' to make out its case. As oral hearsay was
becoming discredited, uneasiness about the use of 'deposi-
tions' began to take shape . . . in the form of a limitation
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the
adverse party, sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including
the name and address of the declarant.
MD. RULE 5-804(b)(5).
13. 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364 at 28
(James H. Chadbourn ed. 1974).
14. Federal Rule 801 provides the following definitions:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is
(1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the
person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
FED. R. EVID. 801.
15. Maryland Rule 5-801(c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted." MD. RULE 5-801(c).
16. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 13, at 15. Another commentator traces the development
of the right to jury trial to the "reign of Henry IV [1399-1413] . . . [when]
[aill evidence was required to be given at the bar of the court, so that the
judges might be able to exclude improper testimony." See J.E.R. Stephens,
The Growth of Trial by Jury in England, 10 HARv. L. REV. 150, 159 (1896).
James B. Thayer notes in this period, in 1349, at least one judge ruled that a
witness could testify to "nothing but what they knew as certain .. .what they
see and hear." James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L.
REV. 249, 304-05 (1892).
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that they could only be used when the witness could not be
produced at the trial. 7
The conviction and execution of Sir Walter Raleigh, in 1603,
was important to the development of the hearsay rule." Raleigh's
conviction was based almost exclusively on two items of hearsay
testimony. 9 A witness testified at the trial that he overheard an
unknown Portuguese gentleman in a tavern state: "[Y]our king shall
never be crowned for Don Cobham and Don Raleigh will cut his
throat before he comes to be crowned. ' 20 The only other item of
evidence against Raleigh was a written confession obtained from,
and later recanted by, Lord Cobham.
21
After Raleigh's execution, public concern developed about the
injustice of using the unknown hearsay declarant's accusation and
the recanted confession as the basis for Raleigh's conviction.2 2 Judges
began to criticize hearsay as a "tale of tale," and a "story out of
another man's mouth." 23 The rule prohibiting hearsay was recognized
by the end of the seventeenth century.
24
The principal reason to exclude hearsay evidence is to safeguard
against unreliable second-hand accusations. 25 Live testimony is pref-
erable to hearsay evidence for two reasons. First, a declarant testi-
17. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 244, at 425 (John W.
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
18. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 83 (7th ed. 1992).
19. See id. at 83-84.
20. Id. at 84.
21. Id.
22. Frank M. Tuerkheimer, Convictions Through Hearsay in Child Sexual Abuse
Cases: A Logical Progression Back to Square One, 72 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 49
(1988). "The case, however, is generally considered to be the beginning of the
end of such use of hearsay evidence." Id.
23. See WIGMORE, supra note 13, § 1364, at 18 n.32 (quoting Gascoigne's Trial, 7
How. St. Tr. 959, 1019 (1680), and Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549, 663
(1681)).
24. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 51. In tracing the historical development of the
hearsay rule, one historian described the origin of the rule and its relationship
to the jury trial in this way:
In medieval times, the jury had been a panel of neighbors-knowing
busy-bodies, who perhaps had personal knowledge of the case. When
the function of the jury changed to that of an impartial panel of
listeners, the law of evidence underwent explosive growth. The rules
began to exclude all shaky, secondhand, or improper evidence from
the eyes and ears of the jury. Only the most tested, predigested matter
was fit for the jury's consumption ... . The general rule was that
juries should not hear second-hand evidence: they should hear Smith
tell his story, not Jones' account of what Smith had said.
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 135 (1973).
25. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Pro-
cedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (1990).
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fying in person is required to take an oath against perjury. 26 Second,
a declarant testifying in person is available to be cross-examined.
27
The more important of these safeguards is the ability to cross-examine
the declarant.2 s Cross-examination of the witness reiterating the hear-
say is a poor substitute. The "person who relates a hearsay, is not
obliged to enter into any particulars, to answer any questions, to
solve any difficulties, to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any
obscurities, to remove any ambiguities: he entrenches himself in the
simple assertion that he was told so, and leaves the burden entirely
on his dead or absent author.
' '29
Despite the concerns that allowing hearsay statements into evi-
dence may compromise the integrity of the adversarial process, it is
difficult to contemplate an absolute prohibition against hearsay. In
fact, immediately after courts began to recognize the hearsay rule,
they also recognized the equally compelling need for exceptions to
the rule. Some early exceptions included involuntary utterances,3"
regular entries into shopbooks," and dying declarations.
3 2
26. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970).
27. Id.
28. Although the Supreme Court has never held that there is an absolute right to
face-to-face confrontation even in criminal cases, see Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836, 844 (1990), the value of cross-examination in the fact finding process
has long been recognized by the Supreme Court. See Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237 (1895). Cross-examination provides a vehicle "not only of testing
the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling
him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives
his testimony whether he is worthy of belief." Id. at 242-43.
29. Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns 50 (N.Y. 1812). In Donnelly v. United States,
228 U.S. 243 (1913), the Supreme Court articulated the rationale for excluding
hearsay:
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, is excluded
by courts that adhere to the principles of the common law. The chief
grounds of its exclusion states, that the reported declaration (if in
fact made) is made without the sanction of an oath, with no respon-
sibility on the part of the declarant for error or falsification, without
opportunity for the court, jury, or parties to observe the demeanor
and temperament of the witness, and to search his motives and test
his accuracy and veracity by cross-examination, these being most
important safeguards of the truth, where a witness testifies in person,
and as of his own knowledge; and, moreover, he who swears in court
to the extra-judicial declaration does so (especially where the alleged
declarant is dead) free from the embarrassment of present contradic-
tion and with little or no danger of successful prosecution for perjury.
Id. at 273.




Hearsay exceptions save time and give the court flexibility.
Consider the example of a large retail store suing a defendant who
purchased some furniture but did not pay for it. To prove that the
store had not been paid, the clerk who sold the furniture to the
defendant, the delivery people who delivered it to the defendant, and
the store's bookkeeping personnel would be necessary witnesses.
Trials would be protracted if evidence rules demanded the in-court
testimony of such a vast number of witnesses.
The need to recognize exceptions to the rigid application of the
hearsay rule was obvious, but the development of hearsay exceptions
was by no means organized. Professors Morgan and Maguire ob-
served that hearsay exceptions were developed like "an old-fashioned
crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists,
futurists and surrealists." 33 The exceptions to the general rule against
hearsay were necessary to provide flexibility to the courts, but the
unique combination of harsh applications of the rule and liberal
exceptions to the rule have created controversy.3 4 Mason Ladd pointed
out the irony in the need to exclude hearsay while at the same time
creating multiple exceptions to its exclusion:
The practically universal condemnation of hearsay would
lead to the conclusion that everyone is well informed and
has clear-cut notions on just what this perversion of the
truth is and what the reasons for its exclusion are. To some
extent at least, hearsay is a vague monster with a bad name;
but just what color it is, what shape it has, and whether its
danger consists of sharp teeth or long claws is not known.
Nevertheless everyone is sure that it is bad. However, no
one is particularly disturbed when hearsay escapes the ex-
clusionary rules through one of the many exceptions. Al-
though testimony may be admitted under an exception it is
still hearsay, and the exception could not cleanse it of all
of its impurities.35
Indeed, the problems inherent in developing hearsay exceptions one
case at a time36 were the primary reasons for state and federal
33. Edmund M. Morgan & John M. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at
Evidence, 50 HARV. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937).
34. See RICHARD LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 497 (2d ed. 1982) (stating that "the most common criticisms have
been that the exclusion of hearsay evidence hampers the search for truth too
often to be tolerated in a rational system of evidence law and the proliferation
of hearsay exceptions has created a system of unnecessary and unmanageable
complexity").
35. MASON LADD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 325 (1949)
(footnotes omitted).
36. See Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213, 214,
[Vol. 24
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movements to codify the rules of evidence."
The origins of the federal residual hearsay exceptions probably
owe their present formulations and methodology to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co." The
case involved the 1957 collapse of a clock tower at the Dallas County
courthouse in Selma, Alabama.39 The tower fell and telescoped through
the roof and into the empty courtroom below.40 Following the
incident, Dallas County filed a claim with its insurance company for
over $100,000 in damages. 4' The insurance company refused to pay
because they believed the collapse was caused by faulty design and
poor workmanship.4 2 The County filed suit against its insurers alleging
that the collapse of the clocktower was caused by a lightning bolt
which had struck the courthouse five days earlier.43 The County
pointed to charred timbers in the tower debris to support its posi-
tion."4 The insurance company, on the other hand, alleged that the
charring on the timbers was not caused by lightning, but by a fire
in the courthouse roof, which occurred over fifty years before the
collapse.4 5 To prove its defense, the insurance company offered the
June 9, 1901 issue of a defunct weekly newspaper, the Morning
Times of Selma, that contained an unsigned front page article about
a fire at the courthouse which was then under construction.4 6 The
trial judge admitted the fifty-eight year old newspaper despite the
plaintiff's objections that the article was hearsay and did not fall
within the exceptions for business records or ancient documents. 7
The jury found in favor of the insurance company. 8
The sole issue on appeal was the propriety of the admission of
the 1901 newspaper.4 9 Judge (John Minor) Wisdom, writing for the
218 (1942) (describing the development of the law of evidence as spotted,
accidental, and unsound); see also Edmund M. Morgan, Practical Difficulties
Impeding Reform in the Law of Evidence, 14 VAND. L. REV. 725 (1961)
(examining several causes of the "glacier-like" reform of evidentiary rules at
common law).
37. See Harlan F. Stone, Some Aspects of the Problem of Law Simplification, 23
COLUM. L. REV. 319, 329 (1923); Spencer A. Gard, Why Oregon Lawyers
Should Be Interested in the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 37 OR. L. REV. 287,
298 (1958).
38. 286 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1961).








47. Id. at 391.




Fifth Circuit, could have invented a new exception to the hearsay
rule, perhaps describing the exception as "the defunct newspaper
exception." Instead, he did something much more significant. He
stated simply and succinctly that the newspaper "is admissible because
it is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its ad-
mission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion." 50 Prior to
reaching this conclusion, Judge Wisdom noted: "There is no proce-
dural canon against the exercise of common sense in deciding the
admissibility of hearsay evidence."'" As stated by the court, the
newspaper article was "more reliable, more trustworthy, [and] more
competent evidence than the testimony of a witness called to the
stand fifty-eight years later.''52 The Dallas County case is the em-
bodiment of what is now the federal residual exception to the hearsay
rule."
Federal Rule 803(24) and its counterpart, Rule 804(b)(5), list five
general factors, borrowed from the Dallas County case, that must
be met in order to admit hearsay evidence that does not fall within
any enumerated hearsay exception:
(1) The hearsay statement must be trustworthy;
(2) the hearsay must be offered to prove a material fact;
(3) the hearsay must be shown to be more probative on
the point than any other evidence reasonably available
to the proponent;
(4) the general purpose of the rules, and the interests of
justice must be served by admitting the hearsay; and
(5) the proponent must give reasonable, advance notice
that the hearsay will be offered.1
4
The residual hearsay exceptions were designed to give the federal
courts flexibility and to allow them to admit hearsay statements that
are as trustworthy as those allowed under the existing hearsay excep-
tions."
The codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence began with
the appointment of a special committee on evidence by Supreme
Court Chief Justice Earl Warren in 1961. A drafting committee was
appointed in 1965. A draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence was
50. Id. at 398.
51. Id. at 397.
52.. Id.
53. See FED. R. EvrD. 803 (advisory committee note).
54. FED. R. EVID. 803(24), 804(b)(5). Cf. Dallas County, 286 F.2d at 397.
55. See FED. R. EvrD. 803(24) (advisory committee note) ("It would ... be
presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay
rule have been catalogued ....").
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completed in 1969.56 Under the proposed rules, a hearsay exception
was provided for statements "not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having comparable circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness." 5 7 The committee cautioned, however, that the
exception does "not contemplate an unfettered exercise of judicial
discretion.''5
This early draft of the rules is described by one commentator
as "the high-water mark of judicial discretion to admit reliable
hearsay under a set of federal rules." 5 9 The Supreme Court approved
the draft of the rules, but Congress intervened and delayed their
implementation. 6° Congress then embarked upon its own review of
the rules.
Initially, the residual exceptions were omitted from the House
Judiciary Committee's original version of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. The Committee explained that the exceptions introduced "too
much uncertainty into the law of evidence and impair[ed] the ability
of practitioners to prepare for trial. ' 61 The Senate, however, rein-
stated the exceptions, concluding that they were not intended to be
a broad grant of power to the trial courts, but rather, "the residual
hearsay exceptions [were intended to] be used very rarely, and only
in exceptional circumstances." 62
Ultimately, the residual exceptions were adopted in the form
that exists today.63 In practice, the residual exceptions have become
more of a general rule than an exception, as indicated by the amount
of litigation that has been generated by Federal Rules 803(24) and
804(b)(5) and their state equivalents. By the early 1990s more than
140 federal cases and ninety state cases had been reported regarding
the residual exceptions. 64 Several of these cases concern the proper
interpretation and use of the residual exceptions. One controversy
56. See Ray Yasser, Strangulating Hearsay: The Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay
Rule, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 587-89 (1980).
57. REVISED DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND MAGISTRATES FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Revised Draft) 51
F.R.D. 315, 422, 439 (1971).
58. Id. at 437, 445.
59. Joseph W. Rand, The Residual Exceptions to the Federal Hearsay Rule: The
Futile and Misguided Attempt To Restrain Judicial Discretion, 80 GEo. L.J.
873, 877 (1992).
60. Id. at 878.
61. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075, 7079.
62. S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7051, 7066.
63. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. (88 Stat.)
1926 (adoption of the residual exception in FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5)).
64. James E. Beaver, The Residual Hearsay Exception Reconsidered, 20 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 787, 790 (1993).
19941
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surrounding the residual exceptions has been termed the "near miss"
debate. 65 The debate centers on whether the residual exceptions should
ever be used to admit near miss hearsay-especially trustworthy
hearsay that is very close to a specific exception but does not quite
fit that exception. For example, a particularly trustworthy looking
nineteen year old document will not be covered by the ancient
document rule, which requires that the document be at least twenty
years old. 66
One argument against admitting a near miss under the residual
exceptions is that hearsay admitted under the exceptions must have
guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to that of enumerated ex-
ceptions.67 Advocates of this position argue that if the offered hearsay
does not fit within an enumerated exception, it cannot be equivalent
to that exception.
68
Those who favor the admission of near miss hearsay under the
residual exceptions argue that counsel seeking to offer hearsay into
evidence should not face a Hobson's choice; counsel should be
allowed to argue, in the alternative, that a hearsay statement is
65. Thomas Black, Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) & 804(b)(5) - The Residual
Exceptions - An Overview, 25 Hous. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (1988); Lizbeth A.
Turner, Admission of Grand Jury Testimony Under the Residual Hearsay
Exception, 59 Tui.. L. REV. 1033, 1042-43 (1985) (stating that by using the
near miss approach, some courts admit under a residual exception a statement
that almost falls within an enumerated section); Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Subversion of the Hearsay Rule: The Residual Hearsay Exceptions, Circum-
stantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, and Grand Jury Testimony, 36 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 431, 460-61 (1986) (stating that the near miss problem
concerns the treatment under a residual exception of "hearsay that narrowly
fails to gain admission under a specific provision of the hearsay rules"); Sang
W. Oh, Garbage, Near Misses, and Glass Slippers: The Scope of Admissibility
Under Maryland's Residual Hearsay Exceptions, 25 U. BALT. L.F. 6, 12-13
(1994) (the near miss problem deals with the admissibility of evidence that is
of the type covered by a specific hearsay exception, but fails to meet all of
the requirements of that exception); Rand, supra note 59, at 900 (pursuant to
the near miss theory, evidence of a type governed by a specific hearsay
exception, which fails to meet the exception's requirements, cannot be admitted
under a residual exception).
66. FED. R. EvID. 803(16).
67. United States v. Kim, 595 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1979). "The purpose of
[the] residual exception rule is to allow trial judges to admit certain hearsay
statements that do not fall within any of the specific exceptions, but which
have 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."' Id.
68. See Turner, supra note 65, at 1043-44 (noting the Fifth Circuit's assertion that
a statement failing to meet Federal Rule 804(b)(3)'s corroboration standards
must also fail the equivalent trustworthiness standards of Federal Rule 804(b)(5));
Rand, supra note 59, at 900 (because the residual exception requires guarantees
of trustworthiness "equivalent" to the hearsay exceptions, by definition, hear-
say that explicitly fails under the enumerated exception cannot be equivalent
in trustworthiness to the nearly missed exception).
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admissible either under a specific exception or under a "catch all"
exception.69 The theory underlying this argument is that attorneys
should not have to put their clients at risk by gambling on one rule
over another. Hearsay that comes close to meeting the requirements
of an existing exception is admissible under the residual exceptions,
in most courts, if it is particularly trustworthy. 70 Nevertheless, courts
have held that near miss hearsay is not admissible under either
existing exceptions or under the residual exceptions.71
Other litigation regarding the residual exceptions has concerned
the criteria that should be used to assess the trustworthiness of
proffered hearsay. Courts "will generally interpret the broadly worded
trustworthiness requirement to allow consideration of corroborating
evidence to determine trustworthiness, intrinsic to the making of the
statement." 72 For example, in Idaho v. Wright, 73 the Supreme Court
determined that for Confrontation Clause purposes, trustworthiness
must be shown by the "totality of the circumstances. ' 74 Furthermore,
the relevant circumstances supporting a statement's trustworthiness
include "only those [statements] that surround the making of the
statement" and not corroborating evidence.
7
1
Several factors were addressed in Wright to determine whether
hearsay statements made by a child witness in a sexual abuse case
69. For an excellent article discussing the dilemma created by the near miss problem
see Sang W. Oh, supra note 65, at 12-15.
70. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990) (quoting Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 543 (1986) (explaining that certain hearsay evidence may be
admissible even for Confrontation Clause purposes if "it is supported by a
'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness')).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 571-74 (3d Cir. 1989) (rejecting
hearsay statements both under Federal Rule 803(24), a residual hearsay excep-
tion, and Federal Rule 806(b), the exception for business records).
72. Rand, supra note 59, at 899.
73. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
74. Id. at 820.
75. Id. Although the Confrontation Clause has been recognized as the vehicle to
permit a party in a criminal case to test the trustworthiness of a hearsay
statement, the Supreme Court has rejected a literal interpretation of the
constitutional provisions as a bar to all out of court statements even in cases
where the declarant may be unavailable. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483
U.S. 171, 182-83 (1987) (finding co-conspirators' statements sufficiently reliable
to be "outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion"). A recent
example of the Supreme Court's rejection of the literal interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause can be found in Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
In Craig, the Court acknowledged that face-to-face confrontation heightens
the adversarial nature of the fact finding process, but, nevertheless, concluded
that "the [Confrontation] Clause permits, where necessary, the admission of
certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability
to confront the declarant at trial." Id. at 847-48.
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
were reliable. 76 Those factors included spontaneity, mental state of
the defendant, and lack of motive to fabricate. 77 Despite the' Wright
opinion, most courts seem to judge trustworthiness by both the
circumstances at the time the hearsay statement was made and by
subsequent corroboration of the content of the statement.
78
Another question concerning, the use of the residual exceptions
is the correct interpretation of the requirement that the hearsay must
be more probative than any other reasonably available evidence. For
example, in an automobile accident case, if the plaintiff testifies that
the light was red and the defendant testifies that the light was green,
should a hearsay statement of an unavailable witness about the color
of the light ever be admitted under the residual exceptions? The
76., Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22. In Wright, the declarant/child was too young to
be cross-examined, id. at 809, and thus, the reliability of her statement depended
largely upon these factors. However, it has been noted that only cross-
examination can fully satisfy the fact finding mission of an adversarial pro-
ceeding. As Francis L. Wellman argues in his classic legal work, The Art of
Cross-Examination:
If the witnesses on one side deny or qualify the statements made by
those on the other, which side is telling the truth? Not necessarily
which side is offering perjured testimony, -there is far less intentional
perjury in the courts than the inexperienced would believe. But which
side is honestly mistaken,-for, on the other hand, evidence itself is
far less trustworthy than the public usually realizes. The opinions of
which side are warped by prejudice or blinded by ignorance? Which
side has had the power or opportunity of correct observation? How
shall we tell, how make it apparent to a jury of disinterested men
who are to decide between the litigants? Obviously, by the means of
cross-examination.
If all witnesses had the honesty and intelligence to come forward
and scrupulously follow the letter as well as the spirit of the oath, to
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and if all
advocates on either side had the necessary experience, combined with
honesty and intelligence, and were similarly sworn to develop the
whole truth and nothing but the truth, of course there would be no
occasion for cross-examination, and the occupation of the cross-
examiner would be gone. But as yet no substitute has ever been found
for cross-examination as a means of separating truth from falsehood,
and of reducing exaggerated statements to their true dimensions.
The system is as old as the history of nations.
FRANCIs L. WELLMAN, THE ART OF CROss-ExAMINATION 7 (1923).
77. Wright, 497 U.S. at 821-22.
78. See, e.g., Washington v. Whelchel, 801 P.2d 948, 955-57 (Wash. 1990). Though
the court mentions the principle of Idaho v. Wright-that the circumstances
relevant to a finding of a statement's trustworthiness are only those surrounding
the utterance of the statement itself, and not corroborating evidence-it applied
the customary "9-point set of guidelines to determine whether the reliability
required of inculpatory statements under ER 804(b)(3) and the Confrontation
Clause [were] satisfied." Id. at 955. Some of these nine points look to
subsequent corroboration. Id. at 955-57.
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hearsay, a second-hand statement, is slightly less probative than the
direct testimony of either available eyewitness, but many courts have
construed the "more probative" requirement liberally and have ad-
mitted such evidence. Although it is not necessarily more probative
than the other two eyewitnesses' testimony, it is, at least, more
probative than any reasonably available corroborative evidence. 79
The residual exceptions have opened the courtroom door for
some new forms of hearsay in both civil and criminal trials. Several
courts have admitted, under the residual exceptions, the grand jury
testimony of a witness who had died or had been murdered before
the trial where the circumstances indicated that the witness was
trustworthy and had no motive to lie. 0 In United States v. Wright,8s
79. See generally United States v. Shaw, 824 F.2d 601, 610 (8th Cir. 1987) ("Even
though the evidence may be somewhat cumulative, the 'more probative' re-
quirement can not be interpreted with cast iron rigidity"), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 1068 (1988); United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325, 327-28 (6th Cir.) (the
"more probative" requirement is designed only to prevent "an unnecessary
shortcut"; thus, the fact that hearsay evidence is merely corroborative is not
"fatal to [its] admission"), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 843 (1988); United States v.
St. John, 851 F.2d 1096, 1099 (8th Cir. 1988) (although "the prosecution
should not always be allowed to shore up its case by using hearsay statements,
... it [is] appropriate to allow the use of . . . hearsay statements where the
victim is unwilling or unable to testify"); United States v. Marchini, 797 F.2d
759, 764 (9th Cir. 1986) (hearsay admitted under Federal Rule 804(b)(5) even
though "the importance of the substance of [the] testimony was cumulative"),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085 (1987).
80. See United States v. Walker, 696 F.2d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 1982) (finding grand
jury testimony admissible under Federal Rule 804(b)(5) because it had "strong
indicia of truthfulness" and because it was corroborated by the testimony of
other witnesses), cert. denied sub nom., Bashlor v. United States, 464 U.S.
891 (1983); see also United States v. Thomas, 705 F.2d 709, 711-12 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 890 (1983) ("The grand jury testimony of an unavailable
witness may be introduced under certain conditions without violating the
Constitution or the Federal Rules of Evidencd."); United States v. West, 574
F.2d 1131, 1136-38 (4th Cir. 1978) (finding that an admission at a trial of
slain informant's prior grand jury testimony does not violate the defendants'
rights under the Confrontation Clause, despite lack of cross examination,
because "surrounding circumstances . . .give assurance of reliability"); United
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141, 1146 (4th Cir.) (admitting grand jury testimony
of alleged co-conspirator, who refused to testify at trial, because of reliable
corroborating testimony), cert. denied sub nom., McKethan v. United States,
439 U.S. 936 (1978); cf. United States v. McCall, 740 F.2d 1331, 1337-40 (4th
Cir. 1984) (holding the admission of an affidavit of a deceased Federal
Protective Service officer, and the admission of the hearsay testimony of a
fellow officer, explaining the affidavit, erroneous under Federal Rule 804(b)(5)).
The court distinguished the results in West, Garner, and Murphy because the
hearsay evidence involved in those cases was a grand jury transcript rather
than an affidavit. Id. at 1340-41. The court stated that "grand jury proceedings
with their attendant formalities-official recording of testimony, protection
against witness abuse, and official supervision-afford greater protection for
Baltimore Law Review
entries made by a witness in her diary were found to be particularly
trustworthy and were admitted under the residual exception, after
her death.
8 2
An interesting case involving the application of Federal Rule
803(24) is State v. Knowles, 3 a 1989 New Hampshire opinion written
by Justice David Souter when he was on the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire. In Knowles, the defendant drove his car into a telephone
pole located less than a block from his house.84 He was convicted
of driving under the influence of alcohol and of leaving the scene
of an accident."5 An important item of evidence proving that the
defendant was the driver of the car was the hearsay statement of the
defendant's mother, who approached the police officers immediately
after the accident and said that although she tried to persuade her
son not to drive drunk, he "drove off and hit the pole." '8 6 Aside
from the defendant's mother, the officer did not question any other
witnesses as to the identity of the driver.87 By the time of the trial,
the defendant's mother had not only recanted the statement, she
denied even having seen the accident. 8 The trial court admitted the
statement by the defendant's mother. 9 On appeal, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire affirmed the lower court's ruling, finding that
the officer used "reasonable efforts" to obtain evidence of the
driver's identity to satisfy the New Hampshire version of Rule
803(24). 90
Some writers have criticized the decision in United States v.
Medico9' because double hearsay was admitted under the federal
residual exception. 92 In Medico, the defendant was on trial for bank
robbery. A critical element of the government's case was the license
plate number of the car that the robber used, which matched the
license plate number of the car the defendant was in when he was
arrested. 93 The trial court permitted a security guard of the bank to
the accuracy of the truthfinding process than does the taking of ex parte
affidavits." Id. at 1341. For a comprehensive survey of how Federal courts
have dealt with grand jury testimony see Turner, supra note 65.
81. United States v. Wright, 826 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1987).
82. Id. at 954-56.






89. Id. at 186.
90. Id.
91. 557 F.2d 309 (2d Cir. 1977).
92. ld. at 316.
93. Id. at 313.
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testify that an unidentified customer had given the guard the license
plate number, which the guard then supplied to the police. 94 The
customer had apparently obtained the number from an unidentified
young man who had been sitting in a car outside the bank and who
had watched the getaway car speed away. 9 The guard related that
he watched the customer obtain the number from the young man
outside the bank and then report the number to the guard. 96 Neither
the customer nor the young man could be located by the government
to testify at trial. 97 The guard was permitted to testify to the double
hearsay concerning the license number because the judge found that
the hearsay was trustworthy and that it met the requirements for
admissibility under the residual exceptions."
Obviously, not all proffered residual hearsay is sanctioned by
appellate courts.
In United States v. Mandel,9 the Fourth Circuit rejected the
trial court's admission of certain hearsay statements under the resid-
ual exception in Federal Rule 803(24). l00 In Mandel, former Maryland
Governor Marvin Mandel and several other co-defendants' 01 were
convicted of racketeering and mail fraud. 10 2 The convictions stemmed
from their allegedly fraudulent activities concerning the proposed
construction of the Marlboro race track. 0 3 At trial, the evidence
focused on alleged misrepresentation and concealment by Governor
Mandel and his co-defendants regarding legislation related to the race
track.' °4 Several hearsay statements uttered by Maryland senators
about the Governor's motives behind the handling of the race track
legislation were admitted under the federal residual hearsay excep-
tion. 05 The government argued that Governor Mandel would receive
undisclosed financial benefits in exchange for favorable legislative
action on the bills regarding the race track' °6 and that the personal




97. Id. at 313.
98. Id. at 315-16.
99. 591 F.2d 1347, on reh'g, 602 F.2d 653, reh'g denied, 609 F.2d 1076 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980).
100. Id. at 1369.
101. The other co-defendants tried with Mandel were W. Dale Hess, Harry W.
Rodgers, III, William A. Rodgers, Irvin Kovens, and Ernest N. Cory. Id. at
1353.
102. Id. at 1352.
103. Id. at 1352-53.
104. Id. at 1354-55.
105. Id. at 1367.
106. Id. at 1354-55.
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"constituted a scheme to defraud the citizens and the State of
Maryland." 0 7
The Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions on other grounds, 08
but also addressed the lower court's use of the residual hearsay
exception.' °9 The court explained that the admission of the hearsay
under the residual exception was improper because many of the
statements testified to by the legislators were from unknown sources." 0
Thus, the Fourth Circuit said that it would have been impossible for
the government to establish that it had complied with the notice
requirement of Federal Rule 803(24)."' The court clearly could have
invalidated the evidence on that ground alone but, rather than
conclude it3 analysis on the technical notice infirmity inherent in the
government's evidence, the court went on to analyze whether the
evidence in question possessed the guarantees of trustworthiness also
required to establish admissibility under the federal residual excep-
tion. 1
2
The court rejected the government's argument that the evidence
was reliable because it was confined to the hearsay of state senators
as a result of their unique expertise." 3 The court similarly disposed
of the government's arguments that such corruption cases are inher-
ently difficult to prove and that the hearsay evidence was crucial to
the case.' '4 In rebutting the government's theory of admissibility, the
court noted the dangers presented by admission of such hearsay." 5
It stated:
First, the senators who testified all say that someone else
said that Governor Mandel did not care whether his veto
was overridden. No senator seems to have testified that
Governor Mandel told him that the Governor did not care.
107. Id. at 1357.
108. See id. at 1364-66. The court reversed the convictions because the trial judge
refused to give jury instructions proffered by the defense regarding mail fraud,
bribery, and whether the Governor had knowledge of who owned the mailbox
race track. Id. The Fourth Circuit also noted that it was error for the trial
court to introduce certain portions of the Maryland Code of Ethics as circum-
stantial evidence of intent to defraud. Id. at 1366-67. The appellate court
reasoned that the ethics code was inapplicable to the Governor and thus it
could not be used to define his duties. Id.
109. Id. at 1369.
110. Id. at 1368-69.
111. Id. at 1369. The notice requirement of the residual exception rule requires that
the proponent of the hearsay supply the names and addresses of the declarant.
FED R. EVID. 803(24).






Important also is the whole setting from which this testi-
mony is drawn. We are dealing with a purely legislative
political scene. Some of the most damaging hearsay state-
ments were repeated by long-time political enemies of the
Governor. Further, the statements were made on and around
the senate floor in the heat of political battle, where rumors,
opinion and gossip abound. We are not dealing with an
objectively observable factual event. We are dealing with
circumstantial proof of the position a governor took on two
pieces of legislation. Evidence based on rumors and general
discussions is the worst type of hearsay. Such testimony,
especially from unidentified declarants, does not possess the
requisite guarantees of trustworthiness to justify a new
exception to the hearsay rule. We also do not feel that the
purposes behind the Federal Rules of Evidence or the inter-
ests of justice justify admitting this evidence. In a criminal
case we must be careful that a conviction is not based on
speculation.' 
16
By rejecting the government's argument that the multi-level
hearsay regarding information that was "common knowledge" among
legislators should be admissible, the court upheld the standard that
the residual exception should not become the vehicle to admit hearsay
that is patently unreliable.'
17
Despite the Fourth Circuit's reluctance to admit the hearsay
testimony offered in Mandel, it demonstrated a willingness to admit
residual hearsay under circumstances where greater reliability can be
established."' In United States v. Ellis,"9 another case involving a
race track and politicians, the Fourth Circuit admitted hearsay state-
ments under the residual exception. 20 The appellant, Ellis, was a
limited partner in Tri-State Greyhound Park Incorporated, a West
Virginia corporation that conducted pari-mutuel betting on greyhound
races.' 2' Under West Virginia law, Tri-State was allowed to keep a
specific percentage of the revenue generated by public betting.
22
Because of unexpected financial shortfalls in 1986, Tri-State's owners
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1368-70. See United States v. Mathis, 559 F.2d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1977)
(stating that "tight reins must be held" on the residual exceptions so that
provisions do not "emasculate" the well-developed hearsay case law).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 2 F.3d 81 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1992).
119. 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1992).
120. Id.




supported a bill that would increase their percentage.'23 Although the
bill passed both houses of the West Virginia legislature, it was vetoed
by the Governor. 24 The owners made efforts to get a similar bill
passed in 1987.125 To support its efforts, Tri-State promised to pay
Ellis $500,000 if the bill became law. 126 Ellis, working through lobbyist
Samuel D'Annunzio, allegedly provided cash and amenities to various
state legislators. 27 The bill passed and was signed by the Governor.128
A subsequent corruption investigation led to a plea agreement from
D'Annunzio, who detailed the corruption scheme and his relationship
with Ellis. 29 D'Annunzio also gave the government tapes, which he
had secretly recorded, of conversations with Ellis and other partici-
pants in the scheme. 30 In December of 1988, in the midst of the
continuing investigation, D'Annunzio committed suicide.'
At Ellis's mail fraud, racketeering, and obstruction of justice
trial, the government sought to admit statements of the deceased
D'Annunzio which implicated Ellis. 32 The United States District
Court for the District of West Virginia admitted the statements over
Ellis's objection that his right to confrontation was violated because
D'Annunzio's statements did not bear "sufficient indicia of reliabil-
ity.""'33 On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the admission of the hearsay
was upheld.3 4 The court reasoned that the statements provided strong
indications of reliability because:
First, D'Annunzio issued the statements voluntarily in the
presence of two government agents and both of his attor-
neys. Second, D'Annunzio made the statements in accor-
dance with a plea agreement which required him to be
truthful with federal investigators. Third, the government
agents were taking notes in the presence of D'Annunzio as
the statements were made. Fourth, D'Annunzio could be
deemed to know, in view of the plea agreement, that what
he was saying would be the subject of further investigation-
and confirmation-by the government. Fifth, though the plea












134. Id. at 583.
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to record subsequent conversations with the individuals he
had implicated, .. . suggesting that he was willing to have
the truthfulness of these statements tested.'
The court further reasoned that, considering the circumstances in
which the statements were made, "cross-examination [of D'Annun-
zio] would have had only 'marginal' value in [the] case."' 13 6
Ellis established, in the Fourth Circuit, a potential basis for
admitting government investigators' hearsay, even if preserved only
by interview notes, as long as the witness (1) has become unavailable,
(2) has agreed to assist in the investigation against others, and (3)
has his attorneys present when he makes his statements and agree-
ments. 137 A legitimate question regarding such hearsay is whether
statements such as those offered in Ellis are or can ever be as reliable
as statements made before the grand jury under oath. Indeed, grand
jury testimony is commonly admitted under Federal Rule 804(b)(5).138
III. RESIDUAL EXCEPTIONS: THE MARYLAND
EXPERIENCE AND THE NEWLY ADOPTED RULES
For the last several hundred years, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland has been following the common-law development of the
hearsay rules. 139 At common law, new rules of evidence were adopted
as cases were litigated. In Maryland, this practice has produced new
exceptions to the traditional rule against admitting hearsay,' 40 but,
at the same time, it has produced a healthy reluctance on the part
of the Maryland appellate courts to extend the common law beyond
its somewhat conservative limits.' 4' The prerogative to create more
135. Id.
136. Id. at 584.
137. Id. at 583.
138. Rand, supra note 59, at 902 & n.130.
139. See McLAIN, supra note 2, at 269.
140. Recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland extended an exception to the rule
against hearsay by holding that certain prior inconsistent statements, which
had been reduced to writing or made before the grand jury, were admissible
so long as the declarant was available for cross-examination. Nance v. State,
331 Md. 549, 571, 629 A.2d 633, 644 (1993). In Nance, the court reasoned
that the prior identification need not be excluded from substantive evidence
merely because the witness later recanted the prior out-of-court statement. Id.
at 562, 629 A.2d at 639. The court extended the hearsay exception without
specific support from Maryland precedent, though it did cite much supporting
case law from other circuits and state courts. Id. at 562-64, 629 A.2d at 639-
40; cf. FED. R. Evro. 801(d)(1)(a) (providing for admission of testimony at
another proceeding that is under oath).
141. See Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 8, 536 A.2d 666, 669 (1988) ("Maryland,




liberal exceptions to the traditional hearsay rules has been left to the
legislative process. 42 While reluctant to adopt any dramatic extension
of the common law, the court of appeals has, on occasion, acknowl-
edged that courts are free to create additional hearsay exceptions
and, indeed, are sometimes required to admit hearsay not falling
within any recognized hearsay exception. 43 In Brown v. State,'44
Judge McAuliffe, writing about the residual exceptions prior to their
codification in the Maryland Rules, stated that "[tihe proposition
that hearsay evidence may be sufficiently reliable to justify its ad-
mission . . . even though it does not fall within a recognized hearsay
exception, is not new.'
' 45
For example, in Foster v. State'4 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed the trial judge for his failure to admit hearsay
that did not fall within any recognized hearsay exception but was
"critical to the defense and bore persuasive assurances of trustwor-
thiness. ' ' 4  In Foster, the defendant, Doris Ann Foster, was convicted
of felony murder. 48 The evidence at issue was a statement made by
the victim to his friend that Foster's husband had threatened to kill
the victim. 49 The court held that, as a matter of due process, evidence
that is both critically important to the defense and that carries certain
indicia of reliability must be admitted even though it does not meet
the requirements of any common-law exception. 150 Although the
admission of the statement was based in part on constitutional
considerations, it demonstrated the circumstances that make residual
exceptions occasionally necessary. Occasional recognition of the power
of a court to create residual exceptions, however, could give way to
comprehensive change.
142. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-103.1 (Supp. 1994)
(admitting out of court statements of child abuse victims).
143. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772 (1989); Foster v. State,
297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983).
144. 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772 (1989).
145. Id. at 426, 564 A.2d at 776 (citing G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub.
Co., 207 F. 515 (2d Cir. 1913)).
146. 297 Md. 191, 464 A.2d 986 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984).
147. Id. at 212, 464 A.2d at 997 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
300-02 (1973)).
148. Id. at 192, 464 A.2d at 987.
149. Id. at 209, 464 A.2d at 996. Although the court of appeals extended the
hearsay exceptions to permit Foster an opportunity to present hearsay evidence
in support of her defense, the court rejected a similar claim in Powell v. State,
324 Md. 441, 453, 597 A.2d 479, 485 (1991). In Powell, the court concluded
that the out-of-court declarations differed from those in Foster since the
uncorroborated statements were neither critical to the defense nor particularly
reliable. Id. at 451-53, 597 A.2d at 484-86.
150. Id. at 210-12, 464 A.2d at 996-97.
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Ultimately, Maryland decided to codify its rules of evidence
rather than to continue to permit those rules to be fashioned through
occasional court decisions. 5' The codification process was initiated
in 1976 with the Rodowsky Report, authored by the Court of Appeals
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the Rules
Committee).12 The Rodowsky Report "recommended the adoption
of a code derived from the Federal Rules of Evidence."'5 The Court
of Appeals of. Maryland chose not to proceed with the codification
at that time.
5 4
The project was rejuvenated in October of 1988, when Chief
Judge Robert C. Murphy of the court of appeals charged the Rules
Committee to propose a total codification of Maryland's evidence
rules based on the Federal Rules. 55 After several committee and
subcommittee meetings, at which drafts of the proposed rules were
reviewed, and after several public hearings, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland voted, on December 15, 1993, to adopt the proposed
codification of the rules by a vote of six to one. 56 Judge Eldridge,
dissenting from the adoption of the rules, explained his concerns
about the wisdom of codifying evidence rules in Maryland:
There has long been a movement in this country towards
codifying all areas of the law and away from the common
law approach. While in some areas this may be justified, in
others the flexibility and strengths of the common law
system are lost. The existing Maryland law of evidence,
consisting of a few statutes and rules but largely of common
law principles, has worked well, with both stability as well
as flexibility to meet new circumstances and changed con-
ditions. I am unconvinced that existing Maryland evidence
law should be jettisoned in favor of this new code. 
1 7
Judge Chasanow, the co-author of this Article, was joined by Judge
Bell in his endorsement of the codified rules subject to a partial
dissent158
151. MD. RULES 5-101 to 5-1008 (Title 5).
152. McLArN, supra note 2, at 6.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 7. Rather than recommend that the Rules Committee proceed with full
scale codification consistent with the Federal Rules of Evidence as the report
had suggested, the court decided to wait. Id. The primary motivation for the
court's reluctance to proceed was a desire to "wait until the federal rules were
seasoned." Id.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. at 10-11.
157. Id. at 43.
158. Id. at 43-48. While enthusiastically supporting the codification of the Rules of
Evidence, Judges Chasanow and Bell expressed concerns regarding whether it
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During the process of drafting and adopting the new rules, one
of the more difficult decisions for the court was whether to adopt
some form of the residual hearsay exceptions.5 9 The evidence sub-
committee, by an almost equally divided vote, decided not to rec-
ommend the adoption of the residual exceptions. 160 The Rules
Committee, also by an equally divided vote, ratified the subcommittee
recommendation .161
In Committee, several arguments were advanced against admit-
ting hearsay under residual exceptions. These arguments were pre-
dominantly concerned with eliminating the flexibility from which
courts had benefitted for hundreds of years. 62 Several arguments
were also advanced favoring the admission of hearsay under residual
exceptions. Proponents of the residual hearsay exceptions were pre-
dominantly concerned with the unrealistic and unnecessarily rigid
restraints on judicial discretion by the Rules. 63 Perhaps the best
argument in favor of the application of the residual exception is this
statement by the Federal Advisory Committee: "It would ... be
presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the
hearsay rule have been catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to
oncoming generations as a closed system."' 64
The vigorous debate regarding the wisdom of adopting residual
exceptions fostered a desire on the part of the Rules Committee to
proceed with caution on this controversial issue. The Rules Committee
ultimately did adopt residual hearsay exceptions but placed into the
text of both Rule 5-803(24) and Rule 5-804(5) the introductory
limiting language that the residual exceptions should be used only
"[u]nder exceptional circumstances."'' 65 A Committee note, which
was prepared by the court of appeals, left little doubt that the
was necessary to modify "over 80% of the Federal rules." Id. at 43. Although
some of their concerns related to the adoption of certain hearsay exceptions-
Rule 5-801 classifying of admissions as non-hearsay, Rule 5-802.1 including
prior statements by witnesses as a hearsay exception under circumstances when
the declarant is a testifying witness subject to cross-examination, and Rule 5-
803 noting numerous changes from the federal rules to the business records
hearsay exceptions that may cause confusion for lawyers and judges-the
adoption of the modified version of the residual exception was not among
those concerns.
159. Judge Howard S. Chasanow, Address to the Wrangler's Law Club (Oct. 21,
1993) (on file with authors); McLAIN, supra note 2, at 268.
160. McLAIN, supra note 2, at 268.
161. Id.
162. See McLAIN, supra note 2, at 268.
163. See id. at 268-69; Rand, supra note 59, at 907-08.
164. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) (advisory committee note); see JOHN W. STRONG,
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 538-40 (4th ed. 1992).
165. MD. RULES 5-803(24), 5-804(5); see MCLAIN, supra note 2, at 268.
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residual exceptions to the Maryland Rules of Evidence would receive
only a lukewarm welcome into Maryland's courts:
The residual exceptions provided by Rule 5-803(b)(24) and
Rule 5-804(b)(5) do not contemplate an unfettered exercise
of judicial discretion, but they do provide for treating new
and presently unanticipated situations which demonstrate a
trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated
exceptions. Within this framework, room is left for growth
and development of the law of evidence in the hearsay area,
consistently with the broad purposes expressed in Rule 5-
102.
It is intended that the residual hearsay exceptions will be
used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. The
Committee does not intend to establish a broad license for
trial judges to admit hearsay statements that do not fall
within one of the other exceptions contained in Rules 5-803
and 5-804(b). The residual exceptions are not meant to
authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, in-
cluding its present exceptions. Such major revisions are best
accomplished by amendments to the Rule itself. It is in-
tended that in any case in which evidence is sought to be
admitted under these subsections, the trial judge will exercise
no less care, reflection, and caution than the courts did
under the common law in establishing the now-recognized
exceptions to the hearsay rule.166
The exceptional circumstances requirement, fortified by the ex-
tensive Committee note' leaves no doubt that the Maryland residual
exceptions are more restrictive than their federal counterparts.167 The
rules may lead the Maryland courts to admit many kinds of hearsay
that clearly would have been inadmissible under the common law.
On the other hand, the "catch all" exceptions may be used by the
courts only as a tool to assist and to support the fact-finding process.
IV. CONCLUSION
Maryland has made a sound decision to codify its rules of
evidence and to follow the trend of the majority of jurisdictions that
166. MD. RULE 5-803(24) (advisory committee note).
167. The Maryland Rules, which require the presence of exceptional circumstances
in order to admit hearsay under the residual exceptions, would logically require
a more persuasive showing of necessity than their federal counterparts that do
not require a showing of exceptional circumstances. Compare MD. RULE 5-




enjoy the clarity and simplicity of a comprehensive evidence code. 168
The adoption of the residual hearsay exceptions in the Maryland
Rules was both timely and necessary. The Maryland version of the
residual hearsay exceptions manifests appropriate caution in intro-
ducing the residual hearsay concept to the Maryland courts. It permits
careful development of the exceptions in appropriate cases, while
limiting the possibility that the exceptions will be casually or thought-
lessly invoked by advocates seeking only to obscure an appellate
record or to frustrate an adversary. Maryland's version of the residual
exceptions appropriately delegates the responsibility to make major
changes to the recognized hearsay exceptions to the Rules Committee,
while providing judges with the flexibility that is necessary in excep-
tional situations. This should reduce the divergent and inconsistent
interpretations of the rule that have plagued the federal courts. Judges
and lawyers alike should treat our new residual exceptibn as a package
containing fragile yet important contents-marking it with "caution"
and handling it with care.
168. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 12-21-1 to 12-21-285 (1994); N.Y. CiV. PRAc. L. &
R. 4501 - 4546 (Consol. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-385 to 8.01-420.4
(Michie 1994).
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